Preliminary program.
8:30 Opening
8:40 – 9:25 Keynote 1, Nicolas Stier Moses (Facebook): Pacing Mechanisms For Ad Auctions
9:30 – 9:50 Benjamin Heymann. Cost Per Action Constrained Auctions. artice 1 heymann
9:50 – 10:10 Rahul Chandan, Dario Paccagnan, Bryce L. Ferguson and Jason R. Marden. Computing Optimal Taxes in Atomic Congestion Games. article 2 chandan
10:10 – 10:30 Dmitry Moor. Data Markets with Dynamic Arrival of Buyers and Sellers. article 3 moor
10:30- 10:50 Mohammad Mahdi Khalili, Xueru Zhang and Mingyan Liu. Contract Design for Purchasing Private Data Using a Biased Differentially Private Algorithm. article 4 mahdi
10:50 – 11:20 Break
11:20 – 12:00 Sigmetrics FCRC Keynote: Erik Lindahl
12:00 – 14:00 Lunch break
14:00 – 14:45 Keynote 2, Itai Ashlagi (Stanford University): Clearing matching markets efficiently: informative signals and match recommendations
14:50 – 15:10 Mohammad Mahdi Khalili, Xueru Zhang and Mingyan Liu. Incentivizing Effort in Interdependent Security Games Using Resource Pooling. article 5 mahdi
15:10 – 15:30 Mehrnaz Amjadi, Vijay Kamble and Theja Tulabandhula. Managing Adoption under Network Effects. article 6 kamble
15:30 – 15:50 Caleb Koch and Alain Rossier. A characterization of cooperation in dynamic network games. article 7 koch
15:50 – 16:10 Break
16:10 – 16:55 Keynote 3, David Parkes (Harvard University): Optimal Economic Design through Deep Learning
17:00 – 17:20 Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken and Ian Kash. On the cluster admission problem for cloud computing. article 8 dierks
17:20 – 17:40 Shih-Tang Su, Vijay Subramanian and Grant Schoenebeck. Social Learning with Questions. article 9 su
17:40 – 18:00 Alon Eden, Uriel Feige and Michal Feldman. Max-Min Greedy Matching. article 10 eden
–
